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Abstract
Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between
organisms. The Lewis-Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to
intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis-Skyrms signaling-game
model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is
predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account,
concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to
consider internal signaling.
1 Introduction
One prominent research agenda in the philosophy of mind aims at explicating
the dependence of sensory phenomenology on biological goings-on. How can neu-
rophysiological processes possibly constitute the subjective, qualitative, ineffable,
1
apparently irreducible phenomenology associated with a perception as of a red
patch or the pain caused by an ingrown nail?1
Many theorists advocate the use of intentional (content-based) notions as a
way to bridge the gap between phenomenology and biology. In this intentionalist
program, phenomenology depends upon intentional properties of mental states.
The intentional content of mental states, in their turn, depend upon the biological
properties of what instantiates them (or other appropriately related states)
(Dretske, 1997; Tye, 1995, among many others). The intentionalist program thus
provides a two-step naturalization of phenomenology.
Affective (pleasant or unpleasant) phenomenology, and painful phenomenol-
ogy in particular, is typically taken to present a problem for the intentionalist
program (Aydede, 2006; Block, 2006). We have recently argued (Klein, 2007,
2015; Mart´ınez, 2011; Mart´ınez, 2015; Klein and Mart´ınez, forthcoming) in favor
of imperativism, the thesis that these difficulties are avoided if the phenomenal
character of pain depends on imperative (rather than indicative) content. Ac-
cording to imperativism, pain gives the experiential equivalent of a command to
its subject. For example, the content of the pain of an ingrown nail would be,
roughly,
Protect your nail!
The effect of such an imperative, under ordinary circumstances, would be
that the subject protected their nail until the problem resolved itself. We
believe imperativism has many advantages. We will not discuss them here.
Instead, we would like to focus on one shortcoming of philosophical treatments
of imperativism, and of intentionalism in general. The foregoing introductory
paragraphs are typical of such treatments, in that the proposal for the content of
1See Chalmers (1996); McGinn (1989); Tye (1995) for compelling statements of the problem.
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ingrown-nail pain is given by means of a sentence in natural language—usually
a simple English sentence. This undoubtedly helps the casual onlooker find
out quickly what the theory is all about (and, if it seems wildly implausible, to
move on quickly), but it is ultimately unsatisfactory if taken literally. Sensations
and perceptions are not linguistic entities, even if they are contentful. It is also
unclear just which of the contents that can be expressed in English can be carried
by these other vehicles. It is similarly unclear how that would work if so.
We can improve on linguistic paraphrases, we suggest, by recasting impera-
tivism in terms of more explicit models of content. In particular, in this paper
we present a Lewis-Skyrms signaling model of those pains that can be produced
both in the absence and the presence of an inflammatory process. This will
be, therefore, a model of all non-neuropathic pains (i.e. most familiar pains)
(Abrahamsen et al., 2008). Abusing language for the sake of brevity, we will
refer to all such pains as inflammatory, but note that the model applies to every
token pain which could have occurred in the presence of inflammation, regardless
of whether it actually did.
Lewis-Skyrms models are explicit about what counts as the imperative and
indicative contents of a signal. We will use these specifications to show that,
in such models, inflammatory pain is indeed predominantly imperative.2. This,
it will turn out, is because the causes of pain are heterogenous (and the same
messages need to be reused in different contexts to signal different states) while
the acts that pains provoke are comparatively unified. We expect two results
2Such explicitness and clarity, while invaluable for our current exploratory purposes, come
at a price: many problems that other psychosemantic theories, such as teleosemantics (Millikan,
1984; Papineau, 1987), tackle, are simply brushed aside in the Lewis-Skyrms models we will be
relying on. For one important example among many, indeterminacy problems (Fodor, 1990)
do not arise in the first place.
This is, we submit, as it should be: adding in the machinery necessary to deal with these
issues would complicate the discussion, with no clear explanatory payback in the present
context. In any event, we expect that the main lessons to be drawn from the present discussion
will carry over to more complex accounts of mental content.
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from this game-theoretic reformulation of the imperativist insight.
First, we offer the resulting Lewis-Skyrms imperativism as a way of elaborat-
ing on the suggestion (made by Huttegger, 2007; Matthen, 2005, p. 240, among
others) that signaling games could be fruitfully deployed in the explication of
internal signaling. If we are right, inflammatory pain is a case of predominantly
imperative signaling, and Lewis-Skyrms models can be used to show this.
By fleshing out the Lewis-Skyrms model, we thus provide a principled way
to approach questions about the content of sensory states. As imperativists, of
course, we believe that all pains (including neuropathic ones), will end up on
the imperative side of the ledger. In order to make the structure of the overall
theory clear, however, we will confine ourselves to a telling set of cases.
Second, elaborating the Lewis-Skyrms model will provide grounds for resisting
a popular reaction to imperativism. Some have argued that pains have indicative
content, just as intentionalists have always said, but a content closely related to
imperatives. In the case of the ingrown nail, pain might represent something like
the goodness or the fittingness of protecting your nail (Bain, 2013; Helm, 2002).
This objection is of interest both because people have raised it as an objection
to imperativism, and also because some authors (including David Bain) have
independently defended versions of these so-called evaluativist accounts of pain.
An adequate evaluativist theory would be troubling for the imperativist. If
the evaluativist is right, suitably phrased indicatives can do whatever imperatives
can do. If so, sticking to indicatives might win out as the suitably conservative,
time-tested, preferable solution. Conversely, if the informational content of pain
turns out to be predominantly imperative, evaluative formulations are just a
different and misleading way to gloss what is fundamentally imperative content.
Our fleshed-out account of content allows us to defend the latter sort of response.
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Section 2 briefly introduces the Lewis-Skyrms framework. Section 3 presents
our model, and shows how and in what measure inflammatory pain is imperative.
Finally, section 4 discusses some possible responses on behalf of traditional
(indicativist) representationalism.
2 Sender-Receiver Games
In a signaling game (Lewis, 1969; Skyrms, 2010), the world can be in one of a
set S of jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive states. A sender is able to
observe which state the world is in. They then use a sender’s rule to choose
one of a set M of messages (also, interchangeably, signals) to send to a receiver.
Upon receipt of the message, the receiver follows the receiver’s rule to do one of
a set A of acts. There is a payoff associated to each state-act tuple (see Table 1).
A1 A2 A3
S1 1,1 0,0 0,0
S2 0,0 1,1 0,0
S3 0,0 0,0 1,1
Table 1: Sender and receiver payoff matrices. At any cell, cij , the first number is the
payoff for the sender of the combination of state Si and act Aj . The second number is
the payoff for the receiver.
In a game with n states, m messages, and o acts, a sender’s rule can be
characterized by an n×m matrix, where each row is a probability distribution
over M, indicating the probabilities with which the sender will send each message
in the state corresponding to that row. Table 2 provides an example of a
sender’s rule for a game with three states and three messages. A receiver’s rule
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is characterized by a similar, m× o matrix in which each row gives a probability
vector over A indicating the probabilities with which the receiver will do each
act upon reception of the message corresponding to that row.
M1 M2 M3
S1 0 12
1
2
S2 1 0 0
S3
1
3
1
3
1
3
Table 2: A sender’s rule.
We will talk of sender-receiver configurations to refer to ordered tuples of:
a sender payoff matrix, a receiver payoff matrix, a vector of unconditional
state probabilities, a sender’s rule and a receiver’s rule. Some sender-receiver
configurations are noteworthy; for example, a Nash equilibrium is a sender-
receiver configuration such that neither sender nor receiver can increase their
average payoff by changing their rule unilaterally. Other configurations might
be the result of the evolution of a population of senders and a population of
receivers following, e.g., the replicator dynamics.
We can calculate the informational content (Skyrms, 2010, ch. 3) that mes-
sages carry about states in a sender-receiver configuration as follows. Suppose
again we are dealing with a game with m states, n messages and o acts. The
(unconditional) entropy of states is given by
H(S) =
∑
1≤i≤m
Pr(Si) log2(Pr(Si))
And the entropy of states conditional on messages is given by
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H(S|M) =
∑
1≤i≤n
Pr(Mi)H(S|M = Mi)
where Pr(Si) is the unconditional probability of state Si. One mathematical
expression of the information that messages carry about states is the mutual
information between states and messages:
I(S;M) = H(S)−H(S|M)
Analogously, we can calculate the information that messages carry about
acts as the mutual information between them:
I(A;M) = H(A)−H(A|M)
The fact that we can describe two informational contents (about states and
about acts) is often offered as a suitable precursor to the distinction between
imperatives and indicatives. Thus, e.g., Kevin Zollman suggests that “in order to
account for the distinction between directives and assertions, we must find . . . a
game where (in equilibrium) the signal carries information about the state and
not the act or, alternatively, about the act and not the state.” (Zollman, 2011,
p. 162); similarly, Simon Huttegger claims that “the emphasis in the meaning
of imperatives is to motivate behavior while the emphasis in the meaning of
indicatives is to indicate some state of the world.” (Huttegger, 2007, p. 410).
In this paper we will follow these suggestions, and quantify the indicative
content carried by messages in a sender-receiver configuration as the mutual
information between states and messages, I(S;M). Analogously, we will use
I(A;M) as a measure of imperative content: high mutual information between
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messages and states means that, as Huttegger puts it, messages indicate states
of the world; high mutual information between messages and acts3 means that
messages motivate receiver’s behavior.4
Messages can carry perfect indicative and imperative content. Consider, for
example, the sender-receiver configuration individuated by the payoff matrices in
Table 1, unconditionally equiprobable states, and a sender’s and receiver’s rule
that are both equal to the identity 3× 3 matrix (that is, the sender is sending
only Mi in state Si, and the receiver is doing only Ai upon reception of Mi). In
that configuration, I(S;M) = I(A;M) = log2 3, the highest possible value for a
game with three states, three messages, and three acts.
But these two contents can come apart. Suppose the receiver is still responding
with the 3×3 identity matrix, but the sender is following the rule in Table 3. If so,
I(M ;A) is still log2 3 bits, but I(M ;S) = 0. Messages in this configuration carry
imperative content, but no indicative content: the receiver is paying attention to
what the sender says, but what the sender says is useless as a guide to the world.
Analogous examples can be constructed in which messages carry indicative, but
no imperative, content.
M1 M2 M3
S1
1
3
1
3
1
3
S2
1
3
1
3
1
3
S3
1
3
1
3
1
3
Table 3: A pooling sender’s rule
We will say that, in a certain sender-receiver configuration, messages are
predominantly imperative iff I(M ;A) I(M ;S) and predominantly indicative
3At least when messages are (partially) causally responsible for acts, as they are in the pain
model we describe below.
4It is possible to quantify the indicative/imperative information that single messages carry
about single states/acts. For example, Skyrms (2010, p. 41) proposes that we quantify the
information that message Mi carries about state Sj as
log
Pr(Si|Mj)
Pr(Si)
and mutatis mutandis for individual acts. The weighted average of these individual contri-
butions is the mutual information between messages and states (acts), which is what we have
proposed using as a measure of the overall indicativeness and imperativalness of messages in a
game.
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iff I(M ;S) I(M ;A). If messages are neither, they approximate what Millikan
(1995) calls pushmi-pullyu representations—at once imperative and indicative.5
Neither of the purely indicative and purely imperative configurations we have
just seen is one in which sender and receiver can be expected to spend much
time in, though. They are not Nash equilibria, and in the purely imperative
configuration the sender (and the receiver) would be better off if the sender was
perfectly informative about the state of the world—the configuration would be
pushed in the direction of perfect indicative and imperative information. The
analogous purely indicative configuration would have a similar fate.6
To develop the model further, then, we turn to discussing a model of inflam-
matory pain. This has two advantages: it is biologically realistic, and it is one
in which messages are predominantly imperative even in equilibrium.
3 A game-theoretic model of pain
Inflammation is an innate system of responses to injury (Ward, 2010, p. 1),
that normally aids in healing.7 For our current purposes, the most important
feature of inflammatory states is that “normally innocuous stimuli produce pain”
(Kidd and Urban, 2001, p. 3). This so-called sensitization can be temporary;
if short-lived it is called modulation, while if long-lasting modification (Woolf
and Mannion, 1999). The effect of inflammation can be dramatic. The inflamed
5Assuming that they are contentful at all. Messages might also be neither predominantly
imperative nor indicative via carrying no information. As pains obviously do something, we
will ignore this possibility in what follows.
6That is not to say that partially pooling configurations never evolve in the game in Table
1. Huttegger et al. (2010, p. 183) report that the replicator dynamics in discrete time takes
senders and receiver to a partial pooling equilibrium 4.7% of the time. Our current point
is, rather, that configurations in which there is information transfer (including the partially
pooling ones reported by Huttegger and colleagues) are inaccessible, at least by the replicator
dynamics, from an initial population structure in which the sender is being perfectly informative
and the receiver pools perfectly, or vice versa.
7Not always, however. Severe inflammation can cause persistent tissue damage, which
singles it out as an important target for treatment; see (Nathan, 2002).
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big toe joint in gout sufferers, for example, can be excruciatingly painful in
circumstances where the very same agent has previously had no trouble: putting
on shoes or even the touch of bedsheets.
We will use the pain of an ingrown nail as an example. The following is a
simple model of inflammation-induced sensitization. The game is played between
a certain nail bed’s nociceptors and the motor cortex. There are two possible
situations in which the game is played: in the presence or the absence of tissue
inflammation. In each of these situations, we will assume that nociceptors are
able to perceive (without error) which member of the following set the world is
in:
S1: The nail is undergoing severe mechanical stimulation
S2: The nail is undergoing mild mechanical stimulation
S3: The nail is undergoing no mechanical stimulation
On the other hand, the motor cortex can undertake any one of the following
four actions:
A1: Protect the nail (very high priority)
A2: Protect the nail (high priority)
A3: Protect the nail (low priority)
A4: Remain at ease
Finally, we assume that the sender has four available messages: M1 through
M4.
There are three “protect the nail” actions: very high, high and low priority.
One way to cash out the difference between them is by thinking of which other
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actions one will postpone in order to carry out these ones: the very high priority
version will promote itself to the top of the agent’s to-do list. The low priority
version, not so much. For more on priorities see our (Klein and Mart´ınez,
forthcoming).
The payoff matrices for the game sender and receiver are playing are as in
Table 4 (only one payoff in each cell: both players collect the same payoff in
every situation):
Normal Inflammation
A1 A2 A3 A4 A1 A2 A3 A4
S1 0 1 0 -1 1 0 -1 -2
S2 -1 0 1 0 0 1 0 -1
S3 -2 -1 0 1 -1 0 1 0
Table 4: The pain game
This payoff matrix is constructed as follows: in the absence of inflammation,
the best action in the presence of mild mechanical stimulation is low-priority
protection; in the presence of severe mechanical stimulation it is high-priority
protection; and when there is no stimulation one should remain at ease. Sub-
optimal acts are penalized by how far they are from the optimum—minus one
point if once removed, minus two if twice. In the presence of inflammation,
protection is prioritized: the optimal act (i.e., the diagonal of ones in the matrix)
has shifted one slot to the left.
In this game, one of the best-paying Nash equilibria8 is given by the combi-
8In the sense that there are other equilibria with the same expected payoff, but none with
a better one. Whenever we speak of “a best-paying equilibrium” throughout the paper, this is
what we mean.
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nation of sender’s and receiver’s rules in Tables 5 and 6:
Normal Inflammation
M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4
S1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
S2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
S3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Table 5: The sender’s rule
A1 A2 A3 A4
M1 1 0 0 0
M2 0 1 0 0
M3 0 0 1 0
M4 0 0 0 1
Table 6: The receiver’s rule
Supposing all three states are equiprobable, Fig. 1 shows the mutual infor-
mation between states and messages, I(S;M), and between acts and messages,
I(A;M), as a function of the probability of inflammation. As the figure shows,
for probabilities of inflammation strictly between 0 and 1, with the exception
of those very close to these extremes, messages in the model are predominantly
imperative, maximally so when the probability of inflammation is one half. A
reasonably good English paraphrase of the content of these messages, then, is:
M1: Protect your nail (with very high priority)
M2: Protect your nail (with high priority)
M3: Protect your nail (with low priority)
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Figure 1: Amounts of imperative and indicative information carried by messages in
the pain game, as a function of the probability of inflammation.
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M4: Don’t do anything
Why do messages behave in this way in equilibrium? In a nutshell, the receiver
is unaware of whether the pain message originated during an inflammatory process
or not, and simply maps each message onto the relevant action. On the other
hand, the sender has to choose which message to send depending on the presence
of inflammation. Solely by looking at a message, then, one can be certain of what
act will follow, but not of what state originated it; hence the imperativalness.9
The assumption that senders see, and receivers do not see, whether there is
inflammation is empirically well motivated. Sensitization involves “an increase
in the excitability of the nociceptor terminal membrane . . . on exposure of the
terminal to sensitizing agents . . . [which] include inflammatory mediators” (Woolf
and Mannion, 1999, p. 1766). Sensitization is largely a peripheral process,
occurring primarily at the nociceptor and the spinal gate (Melzack and Wall,
1965). That is, the nociceptor ‘sees’ the inflammation (meaning: its firing profile
is affected by the presence of inflammation), but the receiver only ‘sees’ the
firing.
4 Indicative Reconstructions
Someone who wishes to deny that the signals exchanged in the pain game are
predominantly imperative has three moves available:
4.1 Rearranging the Game
The first possible response is to advocate a different partition of the set of
possible world states. For example, in the pain game we could recognize the
9More precisely, messages effect a partition of the set of posslble acts, but not of the set of
possible states.
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following states.
S∗1 : The nail is undergoing severe mechanical stimulation in the absence of
inflammation, or mild mechanical stimulation in the presence of inflamma-
tion.
S∗2 : The nail is undergoing mild mechanical stimulation in the absence of inflam-
mation, or no mechanical stimulation in the presence of inflammation.
S∗3 : The nail is undergoing no mechanical stimulation in the absence of inflam-
mation.
If we recalculate the payoff matrices with this new set of states, all best-
paying Nash equilibria turn out to be signaling systems. The signals exchanged
in those configuration are no longer predominantly imperative, and carry perfect
information about both states and acts.
How compelling this regrouping is will depend, of course, on how satisfying
you find brute disjunctions. We dislike them. On the one hand, if this is a
legitimate move then the imperative/indicative distinction entirely collapses (at
least within the Lewis-Skyrms framework). As any heterogenous set of states
can be bundled via disjunction into a single ‘state,’ the same strategy could be
applied to any imperative statement. The distinction between imperatives and
indicatives is worth keeping, and so this sort of move must be illegitimate absent
further justification for the disjunction.
On the other hand, brute disjunctions are theoretically unsatisfying. They
suggest missed generalizations (Fodor, 1997, p. 158). Ideally, we would like
disjunctions like S∗1 to be representable in some way that picks out a single
property common to each of the disjuncts. What might that be, though? The
only obvious common property is that the biologically appropriate response to
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each situation is for the nail to be protected with the requisite degree of urgency.
Put that way, however, it is clear that it is more useful to think of the signal in
terms of the act it causes than in terms of the state that causes it, precisely as
happens with imperatives. So either one is stuck with a theoretically unsatisfying
disjunction (in which case our initial characterization of the game is preferable),
or else one recasts the disjunction in a way that makes clear that it is the action,
not the state of the world, that really matters.
Finally, there are independent, compelling theoretical reasons to separate
mechanical stimulation and inflammation. Consider the assumptions that both
sets of states (the Si on the one hand, the S∗i on the other) are making: the
way of carving state space according to the Si is one in which the presence or
absence of inflammation functions as a background condition, against which
episodes of mechanical stimulation play out. The S∗i on the other hand present
a world of states made up of combinations of inflammation or lack of it, plus
mechanical stimulation or lack of it. Inflammation and mechanical stimulation
should not be run together. Their temporal profile and etiology are very different:
inflammation is often chronic, and can last for months or years, while mechanical
stimulation is usually short-lived. Mechanical stimulation comes most often
from outside, while inflammation is an endogenous process. There are thus good
theoretical reasons to distinguish the two influences, even if the organism does
not. The S∗i partition is hard to defend, even leaving disjunction aside.
4.2 Recarving the Game
Our model is an idealization. Real pain signals are more complicated. Whether
those complications affect the validity of our model is an important question.
One might object that actual pain signals are more finely individuated than
we’ve allowed. That is, suppose one had a larger repertoire of messages such
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that it turns out that different ones are sent in the presence and the absence of
inflammation—see Table 7.
Normal Inflammation
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
S1 1 0 0 1 0 0
S2 0 1 0 0 1 0
S3 0 0 1 0 0 1
Table 7: The recarved sender’s rule
A1 A2 A3 A4
M1 0 1 0 0
M2 0 0 1 0
M3 0 0 0 1
M4 1 0 0 0
M5 0 1 0 0
M6 0 0 1 0
Table 8: The recarved receiver’s rule
This sender’s rule, together with the receiver’s rule in Table 8, constitutes a
best-paying Nash equilibria in which messages are perfectly informative about
both states and acts. Imperativalness is lost again. It is just that the set of
messages is more fine-grained than our model would suggest.
This is not an implausible move. Pains do differ from one another. Most
importantly, pains differ in felt quality: they can be burning, stabbing, shooting,
and so on. Perhaps those differences are sufficient to ground the sort of move
that the expanded table was meant to capture. We take this to be an empirical
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question. We also think that a closer look at the two places where you might
hope to find evidence for a fine-grained view—peripheral physiology and pain
phenomenology—both weigh against this move.
4.2.1 Peripheral Physiology
There is an old view of peripheral pain physiology which lingers on in popular
presentations, on which there are specific ‘pain receptors’ for specific types of
bodily insult. This view has its roots in Johannes Mu¨ller’s doctrine of specific
nerve energies, was elaborated by Max von Frey’s theory of the cutaneous senses,
and found its most sophisticated expression in mid-20th-century physiology
which tried to link specific receptor-types or fiber-types to distinct qualities of
pain.10
These so-called specificity theories fell out of favor by the late twentieth
century. On the one hand, many receptor types relevant to pain were shown
to respond to a wide variety of stimuli. Noordenbos hypothesized that it is
the pattern of firing that matters, not the receptors at the initial location.
Hence, Noordenbos says, “pain may arise from virtually any type of stimulus
or may be the result of afferent patterns which may travel via any available
pathway” (quoted in Bakan, 1968, p. 63). Melzack and Wall’s development of
the Gate Control theory also emphasized the importance of temporal patterning
of responses as well as top-down modulation of spinal circuits (Melzack and
Wall, 1965). This means that the same afferent pattern can have very different
effects depending on the condition of the central gate. This is one of the primary
mechanisms for sensitization in inflammatory pain.
The complexity of peripheral response means that one ought not expect
10For historical presentations, we rely on chapter 8 of Melzack and Wall (1996). For an
updated presentation see Perl (2007).
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differentiation among pain qualities based on simple properties of peripheral
receptors. And indeed, this appears to be the case. Wall and McMahon (1985),
reviewing evidence from microneurography studies that stimulated peripheral
fibers, concluded that there is no simple relationship between peripheral activity
and pain quality. Most importantly for our argument, stimulating very different
fibers and receptors by a variety of means produced identical sensations (Wall
and McMahon (1985); see also Melzack and Wall (1996) p. 87–88).
While subsequent physiological work has led to a partial revival of the
specificity theory (Perl, 2007), that has mostly focused on the presence of ‘pure’
nociceptors and specialized pathways leading from the spinal cord. One must
distinguish the proposition that the periphery contains specialized fibers from
the psychological claim that these fibers have a neat mapping to distinct pain
qualities. The revolt against specificity was against psychological specificity, and
the evidence continues to weigh against specificity in this sense (Melzack and
Wall, 1996, p. 155).
Without psychological specificity, there is no sense in which peripheral firing
can be used to make fine distinctions among pains. So the recarving strategy
does not receive empirical support from peripheral physiology.
4.2.2 Pain Phenomenlogy
Another common suggestion is that some sensory qualities correspond to par-
ticular types of injury. So, for example, one might think that burning pains
represent burns, stabbing pains represent stabs, and so on. This would again
give a basis for making fine-grained distinctions between pains, since presumably
each of these types of pain would demand a different sort of action. Further,
it is entirely a psychological thesis, and could be true regardless of peripheral
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complexities.11
This claim again appears to be empirically false. Pain descriptors do not
really seem to correlate with the type of damage that descriptors would intuitively
pick out. Cuts are often described as burning, stabs as sore, fractures as hot,
labor as stabbing, and so on (Melzack et al., 1982; Melzack and Katz, 2006).
Further, these categories often overlap: lacerations, fractures, and bruises are
frequently described as tender, fractures and bruises as hot, and so on (Melzack
et al., 1982, Table IV).12
Of course, none of this rules out a more specific role for pain quality. (Different
pain qualities might, for example, correspond to different type of protective
action that are appropriate to take. That would be entirely compatible with our
account, because it would preserve degeneracy of states onto actions.) What it
does suggest, however, is that one cannot recover a state-informative role for
pain by going more fine-grained into pain’s phenomenology.
4.3 Reinterpreting the Game
The third available move is to find a description of the imperative associated
with each signal that is syntactically indicative. For example, instead of:
M1 : Protect your nail (with high priority)
we would have
M∗1 : Things are such that you should protect your nail (with high priority)
11Although, of course, only once we set aside the question of how phenomenology knows to
match qualitative character to etiology, given those complexities.
12There is some evidence that MPQ descriptors can be used to discriminate between particular
pain syndromes, as detailed in Katz and Melzack (1999). This work focused on pathological
syndromes, however, and used sets of descriptors to make discriminations among pathological
syndromes. As such, there is little evidence that single dimensions of pain quality correspond
in any neat way to the cause of pain.
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and mutatis mutandis for the rest of messages. There are two ways to read
these indicative rephrasings. On the one hand, the result could just be read as
thinly veiled imperativism. Language is complicated, and imperatives can be
expressed by syntactically indicative sentences. To say “Perhaps you ought to
close the door” is, in the right circumstances, to say the very same thing as “Close
the door!” We’ll call this route, by way of dismissing it, British Imperativism:
phrasing imperatives more politely does not make them any less imperatival.
The other reading would take seriously terms like “the right thing” (or “ought,”
or “is bad,” or other similar possibilities). The rephrasings would be syntactically
indicative because they are meant to indicate something about the world: the
goodness or fittingness or rightness of certain actions. Treatments of pain such
as Bain’s (2013) evaluativism, on which pains depend on a representation of
a disturbance as bad, are very close to this second route. The recommended
content attribution to pain experiences (“this (actual/probable) tissue damage
is bad for you”) is not far from an outright recommendation to deal with and fix
the tissue damage in question. But perhaps such a recommendation can stop
short of an actual imperative, while remaining rationally motivating.
Bain argues that the reliance on indicatives helps the evaluativist “make
sense . . . of unpleasant pains’ status as reasons” (2013, p. S82). This is so, among
other things and very roughly, because reasons should be able to function as
meaningful substitutions of p in the schema pI φ’d because pq. Indicatives, not
imperatives are the adequate candidates for that role. (This is our gloss, not
Bain’s formulation.)
We think that the evaluativist strategy is a more general instance of what
has been called the “Guise of the Good” strategy in moral psychology (Velleman,
1992). The guise of the good thesis says, very roughly, that no one can be
motivated to φ without thinking of φ-ing as good. Thinking of φ-ing as good is
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supposed to be what separates motivation from mere compulsion; equivalently, it
is what gives proper motivational states their reason-conferring force. This is one
reason, we suspect, why Bain and others are attracted to evaluativism: because
they think there is a basic link between pains and the goodness (badness) of
particular states.
Put this way, however, we think that evaluativism falls prey to the same
objections that are ordinarily levelled against the guise of the good thesis. Mark
Schroeder (2008) notes that the guise of the good thesis really comes in a strong
and a weak variety. The strong variety says that motivational states must
represent some action as good: that is, goodness must be part of the content
itself. That is what evaluativism requires, and what we deny. For if evaluativism
requires that actions must be represented as good by pain, it is difficult to see
how babies and animals can have the requisite concepts to have pains (as they
surely do). So the strong reading seems altogether too strong a requirement for
such a basic state like pain.
The weak variety of the guise of the good thesis claims only that motivational
states ‘aim at’ the good: that is, that the good is the formal object of states
like desire (2008). On this weaker sense, motivational states bear the same
relationship to the good as indicative states bear to the truth. Saying that
“Grass is green’ is not to say anything about truth as such, though of course it is
part of the aim of assertions to say true things.
This much weaker sense of the thesis, however, is entirely compatible with
imperativism. It says only that imperatives aim at the good, in the sense
that a system of imperatives is, more or less, good-promoting if followed. On
that notion of good-promoting, we claim, imperatives often provide adequate
(good, rational) grounds for action. One might ground the reason-giving relation
in several different ways. It might be, as Bain suggests, because our bodies
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possess a species of epistemic authority (Bain, 2011). The distinction made by
Hamblin (1987) between willful and non-willful imperatives is relevant here:
non-willful imperatives (instructions, advices, recommendations, and the like)
are issued with the interest of the addressee in mind, and the issuer incurs a
tacit commitment to backing up the imperative with the relevant epistemic
credentials. Being at the receiving end of a non-willful imperative will often
provide adequate grounds for action. See (Mart´ınez, 2015) for an imperativist
treatment of the reason-giving role of pain along these lines. Alternatively, it
might be, as (Klein, 2015) suggests, that we treat the body as a kind of minimal
practical authority. Other relationships are possible. The point is simply that
states can be motivating and reason-giving without explicitly representing their
objects as good. That is all the imperativist needs to satisfy the plausible
intuition behind the weak form of the guise of the good thesis.
A similar point has been made in the literature on imperatives in sender-
receiver games. Recall from our previous discussion that the main divide between
indicative and imperative signals lies on what it is that the signal constrains
the most: world states or receiver acts. If the sender believes that a certain
piece of information about the world might be useful for the receiver (might
figure as a premise in one of the receiver’s exercises of practical reasoning, say)
they might choose to send a signal with that information. The receiver might
then use this information for their own, as yet unspecified goals. This signal
is indicative, and might provide the receiver with a justifying reason for an
action conducive to some of those goals. On the other hand, the sender might
think that they already know what the receiver should do—for example, they
might see that a piano is dangerously hanging from a thin rope right above
the receiver’s head, and thereby issue an imperative signal (step aside!) rather
than wait for the receiver to waste precious seconds working it out for himself.
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That imperative will typically also provide a justifying reason for stepping aside.
Compare Huttegger (2007) and Lewis (1969): what distinguishes indicatives
and imperatives is who deliberates: the receiver for indicatives; the sender for
imperatives. But who deliberates should not bear on the status of a message
as reason-giving. If messages can give reasons at all, then, imperatives can give
reasons.
The advantage of imperativism is not simply that certain kinds of sensory
states might be described as if they were something like imperatives. Loose
analogies are good for motivating imperativism. But imperative content is useful
because it links into a broader story about what content might be and how it
might be naturalized. We’ve shown that imperative content is, in an important
sense, relatively easy to generate. It is one pole along a spectrum of different
sender-receiver strategies. It is no more odd, considered this way, than indicative
content. Sterelny has argued that internal representations are biologically
important because they are “decoupled” from particular actions. That lets the
same representation be used in a variety of different circumstances (Sterelny,
2003). We have argued that imperatives play a structurally complimentary role:
they are ‘decoupled’, if you like, from states of the world. Imperatives thus allow
many disparate states of the world to result in the same adaptive action. Neither
imperatives nor indicatives are more primitive. Both play an ineliminable role
in complex adaptive action.
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